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A Paper Tiger? An Examination of the
International Religious Freedom Act's
Impact on Christianity in China
BY BETrY L. WONG*
Introduction
More Christians have died in this century alone for their faith
"than in the first nineteen centuries after the birth of Christ."' Many
such believers have endured religious persecution in China, one of
the most active oppressors of Christianity.2 Yet, the United States,
while spearheading other global humanitarian efforts, largely either
has failed to recognize or simply has ignored the plight of Christians
in China3 until recently.4
On October 27, 1998, former President Clinton signed into law
the International Religious Freedom Act ("IRFA").' IRFA created a
commission to monitor worldwide religious persecution.6 It also
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1. NINA SHEA, IN THE LION'S DEN 1 (1997).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 6. In 1996, to prepare U.S. Ambassador Jim Sasser for his diplomatic
post in China, the State Department briefed him on the oppression of Tibetan
Buddhists. However, it neglected to advise him on the one hundred million
Christians who faced persecution daily for worshipping in underground churches.
Though the State Department's omission may be open to interpretation, it at least
implicitly invalidates Christian persecution as compared to other persecuted groups.
4. BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, ANN. REP. ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1999) [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE 1999
REPORT].
5. Id.
6. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat.
2787 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6415) (1998) [hereinafter IRFA].
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proscribed a list of actions that the commission could recommend via
report to the State Department and the President to expand religious
freedom in countries where the United States has diplomatic ties.'
In addition to requiring the State Department to issue an annual
report on the persecution of major faiths worldwide, Congress also
has chosen to study Christians in particular.9 As such, this paper will
focus primarily on the religious persecution of Christians in China.
This Note will begin by briefly tracing the history of Christian
persecution in China. This Note will then discuss and comment on
the U.S. response, namely the enactment of IRFA, to this crisis. The
effectiveness of the options posed under IRFA will be evaluated by
comparing the proposed action with past attempts at improving
human rights. Finally, this Note will conclude by determining which
measures would be most productive in encouraging China to honor
religious freedom for both Christians and other people of faith.
I. History and Justification for Anti-Christian
Sentiment in China
Chinese hostility towards Christianity goes back several
centuries. Catholic missionaries from Europe first introduced this
"Western" faith to China in the 1500s." However, as contact between
China and the Western world increased, hostility towards Christianity
also grew. 2
China had suffered terribly at the hands of Westerners. 3 Europe
had introduced opium to China in the 1800s, which had the
debilitating effect of reducing Chinese laborers to drug addicts.'4 To
rid itself of such European influence, China fought and lost the
Opium War at great expense. 5 The Treaty of Nanking, which
7. Id. § 405(a).
8. Id. § 203(a).
9. BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, U.S. POLICIES IN SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: FOCUS ON CHRISTIANS
(1997).
10. Bruce Kennedy, China's New Spirituality, at
http://www8.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/dispatches/09.20.spirituality/index.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. LYNN PAN, SONS OF THE YELLOW EMPEROR: A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE
DIASPORA 43-57 (1994).
14. See id. at 43-44.
15. See id.
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concluded the War, forcibly opened Chinese ports to trade.16
Pursuant to the terms of the treaty, China ceded Hong Kong to Great
Britain for ninety-nine years. 7 Decades after the Opium War, a
Chinese man who claimed to be Jesus Christ's younger brother
spearheaded the Tai Ping Rebellion, which led to much bloodshed in
China. The accumulation of anti-Christian/anti-Western sentiment
climaxed in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900.'9 The Boxers, a mystical
sect of martial arts practitioners, regularly attacked Christian
missionaries in efforts to cleanse China of all foreign influence? The
Boxer Rebellion was eventually squashed.2'
Ironically, China's first president, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and his
successor, Chiang Kai-shek, were both Christians.' Christianity
thrived' until China fell into Communist hands in 1949.24 The
Communists believed that religion served as a Western brainwashing
tool used to infiltrate Chinese thought and undermine national
unity.? Consequently, as China remains Communist to this day,
Christians have endured persecution at varying intensities over the
years.'6 As China continues to equate Christianity with the West,
Christians have become the perfect "scapegoats for societies that aim
to vent, foment, and popularize hatred of the West."' 7
H. Current State of Christianity in China
China currently implements its religious policies through the
16. Id.
17. See id. at 44.
18. See id.; see also Kennedy, supra note 10.
19. See Kennedy, supra note 10.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. PAN, supra note 13, at 126; see also Kennedy, supra note 10.
23. See Hearings on Religious Persecution in China Before U.S. Comm'n on Intl
Religious Freedom (Mar. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Xiqui (Bob)
Fu, House-Church Leader), at http://www.uscirf.gov/hearings/l6marOO/bob_-Fu.php3
(last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
24. See id.; see also Kennedy, supra note 10.,
25. See Hearings, supra note 23 (statement of Mickey Spiegel, Specialist on
Religious Freedom Issues, Human Rights Watch), at
http://www.uscirf.govlhearings/16marOO/mickey-spiegel.php3 (last visited Oct. 1,
2001).
26. See Hearings, supra note 23 (statement of Xiqui (Bob) Fu, House-Church
Leader), at http:/lwww.uscirf.gov/hearings/l16marOObob_-Fu.php3, (last visited Oct. 1,
2001).
27. SHEA, supra note 1, at 5.
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Religious Affairs Bureau ("RAB"), an agency formed under the
Department for a United Front which, in turn, answers to the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP").2 The RAB
oversees and controls all Christian churches through the framework
of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement ("TSPM").29 The Three-Self
policy, central to TSPM, dictates that all religious organizations
become self-administering, self-supporting, and self-propagating?0
This policy aims to remove foreign influence from religious
organizations in China.3
While the self-sufficiency model may sound attractive initially, it
conflicts with the Christian doctrine which proclaims that all
believers, regardless of physical boundaries, belong to the body of
Christ.32 As Chinese churches experience revival from fifty years of
Communist rule, isolation from the international Christian
community deprives them of much-needed theological training33 and
financial support.'
Although China now permits Bible printing,35 and even has state-
sanctioned churches where Protestants and Catholics may worship,'
Beijing continues to monitor and control the propagation of
Christianity through registration.37  Registration means that a
congregation agrees to have its independence curtailed in both
administrative and substantive matters. It licenses the government
to select clergy, supervise a church's financial affairs, veto building
programs, scrutinize the content of sermons and distribution of
religious materials, and restrict or limit activities such as education
and social welfare projects.39
28. Id. at 59.
29. Id.
30. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCHIASIA, CHINA: STATE CONTROL OF RELIGION 13
(1997).
31. Id. at 13-14.
32. 1 Corinthians 12:12-31.
33. See, e.g., Daniel Kwan, Early Freedom for Bible Man, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 11, 1994, at 12, available at LEXIS, News Library.
34. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, 2000 ANN. REP. ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: CHINA (2000) [hereinafter
DEP'T OF STATE 2000 REPORT].
35. See id.
36. See BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, supra note 9.
37. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 30, at 17.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id.
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Registration further empowers authorities to shape church
membership. For example, the government has forbidden the church
from proselytizing to minors under eighteen years of age.' As the
government perceives children as the "future torch-bearers of [the]
Communist revolution," it desires to inculcate minors in dialectical
materialism (atheism) as the correct worldview." Hence, sustaining a
congregation becomes increasingly difficult, as a church may lack the
membership from within to raise and train a new generation of
leadershipf Also, RAB officials have access to membership rolls
upon demand. The lack of anonymity may be potentially dangerous
should China decide to end all tolerance towards religion.
Beijing may even intervene in matters as intimate as baptism.4'
To become eligible for baptism into the official state-sponsored
church, a candidate must complete a form in triplicate, attach photos,
and submit it to the government. One application goes to the RAB,
one to the relevant patriotic association, and the remaining one to the
candidate's work unit.46 If any of these three groups objects, the
person may not receive baptism.'7 Penalties for violating ordinances
governing religious activity range from cease and desist orders, to
registration revocation and confiscation of facilities,4 to fines running
between 500 renminbi (approximately US$70) to 50,000 renminbi
(approximately US$7,000).49
As intrusive as registration is for the state-sponsored church, the
"unofficial" church, also known as the house/underground church
where possibly seventy million or more Christians worship,50 suffers
more intense persecution because it refuses to register with the
government.5 House church attendees believe that registration
40. Id.
41. Hearings, supra note 23 (prepared statement of Reverend Dr. Kim-Kwong
Chan, Hong Kong Christian Council), at
http://www.uscirf.govlhearings/16marOO/chanPT.php3 (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
42. DEP'T OF STATE 2000 REPORT, supra note 34.





48. See Louis Won, Rights Group in Call on Religious Persecution, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 14, 1994, at 9.
49. HuMAN RIGHTS WATcH/ASIA, supra note 30, at 20-21.
50. See DEP'T OF STATE 2000 REPORT, supra note 34.
51. See id.
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would compromise their faith by giving ultimate authority to the state
rather than to God 2
Because house churches operate contrary to TSPM policy,
Beijing deems such churches illegal and cracks down on them. 3 In
April 1996, local police shut down over three hundred house churches
in Shanghai alone.' Similarly, from February to June 1996, police in
Zhejiang province destroyed at least fifteen thousand unregistered
temples, churches, and tombs.5 During that same period, the
government arrested, detained, and imprisoned five evangelical
women in Xinjiang province after raiding a house church. 6 Police
severely beat several of the Christians at that church, knocked out
one woman's front teeth, and poured scalding hot water on others
who resisted orders. 7 These examples typify the sort of treatment
that many Christians in the underground church endure daily because
of their faith. 8
The persecution has intensified recently with the passage of the
"law against cults" on October 30, 1999, by the National People's
Congress of China. 9 This legislation mandates government officials
to mobilize their respective communities to eliminate evil cults from
Chinese society: The "law against cults" defines a cult as "an illegal
organization that use[s] religions, qigong (a form of meditative
exercise), or other forms to deify their leaders, to spread superstitions
and heresy to misguide and cheat others, to recruit and control
52. See Hearings, supra note 23 (statement of Xiqui (Bob) Fu, House-Church
Leader), at http://www.uscirf.gov/hearings/16marOO/bob_-Fu.php3 (last visited Oct. 1,
2001).
53. Id.
54. SHEA, supra note 1, at 60.
55. Id. at 61.
56. Id. at 61-62.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Daniel Kwan, Religious Persecution "Stepped Up," S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 24, 1993, at 7, available at LEXIS, News Library; see also Mark
McSherry & Elaine Chan, Christian Torture in China Shocks Patten, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 25, 1993, at 4, available at LEXIS, News Library; see also Chris
Yeung & Daniel Kwan, Police Detain 100 in Persecution Cover-up, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 7, 1993, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library.
59. Hearings, supra note 23 (prepared statement of Frank Lu Si Qing, Director of
Hong Kong-based Information Center for Human Rights and Democratic
Movements in China and former political prisoner), at
http://www.uscirf.gov/hearings/16marOO/frankLuPT.php3 (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
60. Id.
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members, and to endanger society."6 The ambiguous definition of
what constitutes a cult accords government officials tremendous
discretion in determining who has violated this particular law.62
Already, the CCP has enforced this law against several Christian
groups,' sentencing "violators" to labor camps, which are comparable
to prisons, for years. 4  Congress enacted IRFA against this
backdrop.6
. U.S. Response: The International Religious Freedom Act
On October 27, 1998, President Clinton signed IRFA into law.66
IRFA consists primarily of three components. 67 First, it requires an
annual report on the state of international religious freedom during
the past year.6' Second, IRFA establishes a new position, the
Ambassador at Large, who will chair a newly created agency called
the Office on International Religious Freedom.69 The Ambassador at
Large's role is to advise the President and the Secretary of State on
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. Christian groups include the China Evangelistic Fellowship, China Fang-
Cheng Group, Quan-fan-wei (Total Scope Church), Huhan (the Shouters) Sect, Met-
tu (Disciples) Sect, San-ban-pu-ren (Three Shifts of Servants) Sect, Bei-Li-Wang
(Established King) Sect, Dong Fang Shan Dian (Eastern Lightning) Sect, Zhu-Shen
(Supreme Spirit) Sect, Ling-Ling Sect, Xin-Yue Jiao Hui (New Testament Church),
Jue (Absolute) Sect, Leng-Shui (Cold Water) Sect, and the Blood Water and Sacred
Spirit Bless Preaching Group. The membership of these Christian organizations
altogether number about five million.
64. Id.
65. See IRFA § 2(a)(4). Congress found that:
The right to freedom of religion is under renewed and, in some cases,
increasing assault in many countries around the world. More than one-half
of the world's population lives under regimes that severely restrict or
prohibit the freedom of their citizens to study, believe, observe, and freely
practice the religious faith of their choice. Religious believers and
communities suffer both government-sponsored and government-tolerated
violations of their rights to religious freedom. Among the many forms of
such violations are state-sponsored slander campaigns, confiscations of
property, surveillance by security police, including by special divisions of
"religious police", severe prohibitions against construction and repair of
places of worship, denial of the right to assemble and relegation of religious
communities to illegal status through arbitrary registration laws, prohibitions
against the pursuit of education or public office, and prohibitions against
publishing, distributing, or possessing religious literature and materials.
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the best measures available under IRFA to deal with nations that
violate religious freedom." Lastly, the Act creates the Commission
on International Religious Freedom (the "Commission"). 7  The
Commission consists of the Ambassador at Large, who serves as an ex
officio member, and nine U.S. citizens, primarily academics who are
recognized experts on religion.7 ' The Commission annually reviews
the state of religious freedom worldwide and makes policy
recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and
Congress 3 It must issue a report on religious freedom every year by
May 1st. ' The State Department considers the Commission's
recommendations and each September, must issue an annual report
on religious freedom that will help shape U.S. foreign policy.
75
The Act provides for fifteen remedial actions that the
Ambassador at Large may recommend to the President and the
Secretary of State in dealing with countries that suppress religious
freedom.76 Alternatively, the President may bypass the suggestions
altogether if his actions would be commensurate with the
recommendations and would further U.S. policy under IRFA.'
However, in so doing, he must report and justify his actions to the
appropriate congressional committees.7 The President's primary
objective is to negotiate and enter into binding agreements with
foreign governments that obligate those governments to cease or
phase-out any policy or practice that violates religious freedom.
A. Evaluation of IRFA
The following is the list of fifteen actions that the Ambassador at
Large may recommend to the President and Secretary of State in
dealing with countries that violate religious freedom.' Generally,
each action is addressed under a separate heading. However, similar







76. IRFA § 405(a).
77. Id. § 405(b).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 405(c).
80. Id. § 405(a).
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economic sanctions, where the same arguments would apply for each
individual provision.
Option 1: Public Demarche
An official public demarche likely will not deter China from
persecuting Christians. In 1993, under similar circumstances
involving oppression in Tibet, the European Community ("EC")
issued a demarche criticizing China's human rights record in Tibet.8'
The demarche accomplished nothing.' Instead, it provoked a formal
protest from China.' The only aspect of the demarche that might
have alarmed China was that for the first time, all EC countries
uniformly voiced their displeasure for Chinese rule in Tibet.'4
While a demarche from the United States may have greater
impact on China, it likely will be ineffectual because China does not
respond well to human rights criticism. For example, after the
Commission released the 2000 Annual Report on Religious Freedom,
condemning China as one of the worst oppressors of religion, China
immediately reacted by claiming that Christians there "have never
had it so good.' 'n In addition, Chinese government officials defended
their record on imprisoning Christians, arguing that the state
incarcerates Protestants because they have broken the law, not
because of their beliefs. Further, they accused foreign missionaries of
exaggerating the number of individuals persecuted.'
Option 2: Private Demarche
If the embarrassment resulting from a public demarche fails to
inspire change and instead, provokes Chinese retaliation, a private
demarche will only be a diplomatic slap on the wrist and will surely
accomplish nothing. Since a private demarche would happen quietly,
the lack of exposure would preclude public accountability.
81. Jonathan Mirsky, EC Envoys Express Concern on Tibet, THE TIMEs, June 3,
1993, at Overseas News Section.
82. Id. The demarche's ineffectiveness may have been partly attributable to the
fact that the demarche was only four paragraphs long and was contained within a 50-
page report. Further, the EC did not specify any repercussions for China if
persecution should continue in Tibet.
83. Id.
84. China's Official Protestant Church Leader Refutes Repression Claims, WORLD
NEWs CoNNECriON, WORLD REP., Sept. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 26946947.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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On the other hand, a private demarche as a form of private
condemnation may be a better alternative to a public demarche.
Observers, including the Dalai Lama, have acknowledged that a
"gentler policy of dialogue" on human rights" and "quiet diplomacy"
works better than any form of public condemnation.' The
Commission also previously has agreed with this strategy.' Public
condemnation may be "counterproductive,"'" making it "'more
difficult' for the Chinese leadership to make concessions."' Indeed,
the United States and its allies have taken this route in recent years,
abandoning their "campaign to draw attention to China's human
rights record."'93 Nevertheless, this strategy's effectiveness remains
questionable, especially when considering that China still does not
honor religious freedom despite the many attempts at quiet
diplomacy.94
Option 3: Public Condemnation
Public condemnation aside from a public demarche likely will
yield similarly ineffective results. China will protest any U.S. attempt
to condemn China publicly. In March 1999, when the United States
contemplated submitting a resolution criticizing China's human rights
record to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva,
Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan warned that "such
'confrontation' would not solve the problem."'  Furthermore, the
United States would likely receive little or no support for public
condemnation of China from the American business community, as
the latter prefers not to mix business and human rights together.'
The business community would prefer to maintain a good
relationship with China, and not to jeopardize that tie by supporting
87. DEP'T OF STATE 1999 REPORT, supra note 4.
88. Shada Islam, Patten: EU Foreign Policy to Focus on Human Rights, Bus.
TIMES (Sing.), Sept. 3, 1999, at 13.
89. So, What About China?, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Neuilly-sur-Seine, Fr.), Dec.
24, 1998, at 6.
90. See DEP'T OF STATE 1999 REPORT, supra note 4.
91. Islam, supra note 88.
92. Robert H. Reid, Dalai Lama Warns of More Violence; Dialogue with China
over Tibet Called Crucial, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), May 1, 1998, at A19.
93. See INT'L HERALD TRIB., supra note 89.
94. See DEP'T OF STATE 2000 REPORT, supra note 34.
95. Albright Chides China on Rights Violations, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Mar. 2, 1999, at Al.
96. See Islam, supra note 88.
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public condemnation of China's abysmal human rights record.'
Option 4: Public Condemnation within One or More Multilateral
Fora
Public condemnation within one or more multilateral fora may
be effective in urging China to honor religious freedom. However,
because its execution depends upon the cooperation of other
countries, it may take a significant event, such as the Tiananmen
Square Massacre, to galvanize international support.
After the Tiananmen Square Massacre in June 1989, where
Beijing deployed tanks and troops to crush a democratic student
demonstration, European nations denied financial assistance to China
in protest. Belgium froze government loans and ceased other
financial ventures with China.' Likewise, Italy suspended grants and
loans to China." The EC eventually held a summit and concluded
that sanctions such as the abeyance of arms sales, "suspension of
high-level contacts, postponement of new cooperation projects, [and]
prolongation of visas for Chinese students studying in Europe," were
necessary measures to protest China's human rights violations."°
Unfortunately, it takes a tragedy like Tiananmen Square for
international coalition-building to occur. Because the shock has
subsided over the years, however, rallying support within the
international community now may be difficult if not impossible.
Some influential groups within the European Union ("EU") have
expressed their dislike of linking business to human rights in China."'
Consequently, it is not likely that they would support any measure
that would denounce China's human rights violations, especially if
those charges pertain to religious persecution. Moreover, as U.S.
policy has moved towards de-linking human rights from trade issues,
the international community may just as well follow suit. °
97. See, e.g., Matthew W. Cheney, Comment, Trading with the Dragon: A
Critique of the Use of Sanctions by the United States Against China, 6 J. INT'L L. &
PRAC. 1, 23 (1997).
98. Id. at 13.
99. Clyde Haberman, Economic Penalties are Placed on China by Italy and
Belgium, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1989, at 11, available at LEXIS, U.S. News Library,
Combined Papers File.
100. Alan Riding, Europeans Adopt New Sanctions Against Chinese, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 28,1989, at A10, available at LEXIS, News Library, Combined Papers File.
101. See Islam, supra note 88.
102. See id. at 88.
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Option 5: The Delay or Cancellation of One or More Scientific
Exchanges
It is difficult to determine whether continued scientific exchanges
between the United States and China would encourage the latter to
embrace religious freedom, as results from these transactions have
been mixed. Denial of scientific exchanges between the two nations
has either puzzled,'03 or at worst, angered China."°4
Former President Clinton has claimed that his engagement policy
of assisting China with technology has produced desirable results."n
Among other concessions, Clinton's engagement policy has helped
release several prominent Chinese dissidents.' While Clinton did
not specify which crime(s) China had charged these dissidents with,
the fact that China was willing to release them suggests that it might
release religious dissidents as well.
However, delaying or canceling scientific exchanges currently
will not affect the state of religious freedom in China because such
major exchanges are virtually non-existent. Scientific exchanges have
cooled since 1999, after the United States discovered that China had
planted spies in the United States to acquire nuclear military
secrets.' 7 The United States also learned that China had sold arms in
the past to politically volatile Middle Eastern nations such as Iran and
Pakistan."° Furthermore, as China has threatened to annex Taiwan
into the mainland, the United States fears that China may use
American military technology to develop more sophisticated satellites
to direct weapons accurately at Taiwan."°  Seeing as no major
scientific exchanges have occurred recently, denying any such
exchange would have no effect on religious freedom in China at this
time.
103. See id.
104. See, e.g., Paul Wiseman, Meetings with China Contentious: Human Rights,
Missile System Cause Friction, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 2, 1999, at A02, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Combined Papers File.
105. John M. Broder, Clinton Defense Trip to China and Policy of "Engagement,"
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at A8, available at LEXIS, News Library, Combined
Papers File.
106. Id.
107. Ann Scott Tyson, Surprising Lapses Aided Chinese Espionage, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, June 1, 1999, at 2, available at LEXIS, News Library, Combined
Papers File.
108. Broder, supra note 105; see also Cheney, supra note 97, at 20.
109. Bates Gill, A Clearer US-China Picture, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 20,
1999, at 11, available at LEXIS, News Library, Combined Papers File.
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Option 6: The Delay or Cancellation of One or More Cultural
Exchanges
In securing greater religious freedom in China, cultural
exchanges between the United States and China should increase,
rather than suffer delay or cancellation."' It is one of the most
powerful weapons in combating religious persecution. Unlike the
other options that have provoked China's ire, China both welcomes
and grudgingly accepts that cultural exchanges are necessary,
especially as China aspires to become a major player in the global
economy. As contact increases both on a national and local scale,
ideological transformation is inevitable."' Indeed, the CCP already is
"afraid that the normal infiltration of thoughts [and] values would
bring about 'peaceful transformation' and be exploited by... hostile
foreign forces."'1
Cultural exchanges embody activities ranging from tourism, to
student, cultural and legislative exchange programs, 3 to mass media
imports.' The influx of tourists impacts China locally, as visitors
unwittingly bring their own diverse thoughts, cultures, and lifestyles
into the country. U.S. exchange programs expose Chinese students,
teachers, and diplomats alike to democratic ideals that they may take
back with them to their homeland."5
Cultural exchange manifesting itself in mass media and its icons
may also profoundly influence Chinese society. For example, Fred
Dryer, the actor who played Sergeant Rick Hunter in the cancelled
American television show Hunter, has become a hot commodity in
110. Setting Terms of Engagement, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1999, at A16, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Combined Papers File.
111. See Hearings, supra note 23 (prepared statement of Frank Lu Si Qing,
Director of Hong Kong-based Information Center for Human Rights and
Democratic Movements in China and former political prisoner), at
http:/lwww.uscirf.gov/hearings/16marOO/frankLuPT.php3 (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
112- Id.
113. See id.; see also Spencer Abraham, Bid to Improve China's Conduct, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at 14A, available at LEXIS, News Library, Combined Papers
File.
114. Robert W. Welkos, Through His "Hunter" Character, Fred Dryer is One of
the Most Popular Actors in China. Now the Beijing Government is Asking Him to
Make a Film There that Presents a Strong Anti-drug Message, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21,
1999, at Fl, available at LEXIS, News Library, Combined Papers File.
115. BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
ABROAD TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES (1999).
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China. 16  Although Dryer himself desires to remain apolitical,
American media imports such as he, can impact Chinese society
through the roles that they play, the ideas that they expound, and how
they represent themselves to the Chinese media. Indeed, the Chinese
also have recognized the power of such influence, as they have asked
Dryer to make a feature length film in their country as part of their
anti-drug campaign."7  If people pay attention to individuals like
Dryer when he discusses the danger of drugs, they also may listen to
similarly situated media icons when they discuss concepts of religious
freedom and democracy.
The Internet is another form of mass media that has impacted
China greatly. Since 1999, the Internet quickly has become "a source
of news in China" with at least two million subscribers and users
increasing at a rate of forty percent a year."' The world-wide web has
enabled the Chinese to have greater access to information, as Internet
service providers have become bolder in providing both domestic and
international news to their readers. 9
Further, as the CCP unsuccessfully struggles with regulating
Internet content, it also eventually may relinquish control over
currently censored broadcasts such as Radio Free Asia and Voice of
America.' 0 As mass media imports become more readily available to
the Chinese populace, the greater infusion of ideas may give way
eventually to religious freedom.
Options 7 and 8: Denial or Delay of One or More Working,
Official, or State Visits
Denial or delay of one or more working, official, or state visits
generally provides a "tremendous source of leverage [for the United
States in dealing] with the Chinese Government.'' This is because
China attaches both material and symbolic value to an American
President's official visit. Consequently, the United States may take
advantage of this tactic and use it as a bargaining chip in securing
religious freedom for Chinese citizenry."z As to material benefit, an
116. Welkos, supra note 114.
117. Id.
118. Craig S. Smith, Online: In China, a Thousand News Stories Bloom on the
Web, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5437120.
119. Id.
120. Abraham, supra note 113.
121. Broder, supra note 105.
122. Id.
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official visit accords China an opportunity to influence U.S. diplomats
to renew its "Most Favored Nation" trading status annually.
Furthermore, China needs the United States to gain membership into
the World Trade Organization. As a symbol, an American
presidential visit to China connotes mutual acceptance and
recognition of common goals between the two nations."n It signals to
China and abroad that the United States will endorse cooperation
with Beijing despite the country's many human rights violations.'24
Conversely, a denial of an official visit coupled with a public
explanation regarding the refusal, "show[s] ... displeasure for China's
internal policies.""'
Nevertheless, this option's potency appears to have diminished
recently.2 6 Commencing in May 1999, the CCP has suspended the
official United States-China bilateral human rights dialogue." The
suspension has curbed the U.S. government's ability to voice concerns
about religious freedom to Chinese officials."~ Further, Chinese
authorities have even denied granting meetings to U.S. embassy
officials who desire to discuss human rights and religious freedom
issues."
However, even if denying or delaying an official state visit would
impact religious freedom in China, recent administrations have not,
and likely will not, employ this strategy. In June 1998, former
President Clinton became the first U.S. President to visit China since
the Tiananmen Square Massacre in June 1989.130 In response to a
critical Congress which desired to dissuade him from visiting China,
Clinton replied, "[s]eeking to isolate China will not.., open one
more church to those who wish to worship .... [W]e can influence
[China by]... working with China where we can, dealing directly
with our differences where we must.' 13' Given that newly-elected
President Bush supports permanent trade relations with China, he
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. John M. Broder, Clinton Defends Trips, China Policy; Says Approach is
"Pragmatic," COM. APPEAL, June 12, 1998, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Combined Papers File.
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likely will follow former President Clinton's approach with respect to
continuing official state visits.
132
Option 9: Withdrawal, Limitation, or Suspension of U.S.
Development Assistance in Accordance with Section 116 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (the "Foreign
Assistance Act"), now codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n, authorizes the
United States to deny humanitarian assistance to countries that
engage in "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights."133 The Foreign Assistance Act directs the
Ambassador at Large to offer input in assisting the appropriate
committee to determine which countries have flagrantly disregarded
human rights, thereby becoming ineligible for American aid.TM
As of the writing of this Note, this author's research has
produced no recent circumstances under which the U.S. government,
excluding private American charitable organizations, has offered
humanitarian aid to China. Furthermore, while the United States
recently has suspended monetary assistance to China under another
section of the Foreign Assistance Act, it has not done so under
section 116. Consequently, U.S. denial of humanitarian assistance to
China would not expand religious freedom because China has not
recently relied on U.S. governmental aid in resolving national
emergencies. At best, the United States may voice its concern over
religious freedom in China by voting against aid to China in
international fora such as the United Nations. However, by and of
itself, the United States can do very little under section 116 of the
Foreign Assistance Act to stay religious persecution in China.
Option 11: Withdrawal, Limitation, or Suspension of U.S. Security
Assistance in Accordance with Section 502(B) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961
Similar to the provisions of section 116 of the Foreign Assistance
Act, section 502 (B) directs the Ambassador at Large to offer input to
the Secretary of State in determining which countries have
132. Ron Hutcheson, Bush Agrees with Gore on Trade Relations with Chinese,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 18,2000, at 17, available at 2000 WL 5009022.
133. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n(a) (2000).
134. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n(c).
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disregarded religious freedom. "5 "To promote and encourage
increased respect for human rights ... throughout the world," section
502(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act, now codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §
2304, states that the United States will deny security assistance "to
any country... which engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights., 13 6 Specifically,
denial of security assistance includes refusing military education and
training,' antiterrorism assistance," sales of defense articles or
services,.. and licenses for the export of those same articles to armed
forces, police and other internal security forces.140
As of the writing of this Note, this author's research has
produced no recent circumstances under which the U.S. government,
not private American corporations, has offered security assistance to
China subject to section 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act.
Consequently, U.S. denial of security assistance to China would not
impact religious freedom because China has not relied on such
assistance from the United States.
Options 10, 12, and 14: Economic Sanctions
Options 10, 12, and 14 will be discussed together as those
provisions all refer to the imposition of economic sanctions by the
United States against China, thereby denying U.S. financing of
Chinese projects."
135. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(b)(2000).
136. 22 U.S.C.A. §2304(a)(2).
137. 22 U.S.C.A. §2304(d) (2) (A).
138. Id.
139. 22 U.S.C.A. §2304(d)(2)(B).
140. 22 U.S.C.A. §2304(d)(2)(C).
141. These three options are as follows:
Option 10: Directing the Export-Import Bank of the U.S., the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, or the Trade and Development Agency to
Deny the Issuance of Any Guarantees, Insurance, and/or Extensions of Credit
to Any Government, Agency, Instrumentality, or Official that Violates
Religious Freedom.
Option 12: Consistent with Section 701 of the International Financial
Institutions Act of 1977, Directing U.S. Executive Directors of International
Financial Institutions to Oppose and Vote Against Loans Primarily Benefiting
Any Foreign Government, Agency, Instrumentality, or Official that Violates
Religious Freedom.
Option 14: Prohibiting U.S. Financial Institution from Making Loans or
Providing Credits Totaling More Than $10,000,000 in Any 12-Month Period
to Any Foreign Government, Agency, Instrumentality, or Official that
Violates Religious Freedom.
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Although withholding U.S. financing to Chinese projects
presumably may be an effective means to counter human rights
violations in China,142 its usage is unrealized because each time the
United States contemplates suspending funding, it reverses itself.14 A
recent example involves the Chinese sale of ring magnets used to
produce enriched uranium for nuclear warheads to Pakistan, from
1994 to 1995.'" The Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry denied any
knowledge of such transfers, claiming that Chinese corporations
could not consummate any transactions that violated China's export
policy. 45 Thereafter, on behalf of then Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business and
Agricultural Affairs Joan Spero transmitted a letter to the United
States Export-Import Bank ("Ex-Im") requesting the suspension of
U.S. financing for Chinese projects. 146 However, this denial of funding
was short-lived as Ex-Im approved financing for two China projects in
the same year (1996) that Spero issued the letter. 47  The State
Department reversed itself because it determined that the Chinese
authorities knew nothing of the China-Pakistan transfer of ring
magnets. 48 Furthermore, China assured the State Department that it
would bar any such future transfers and agreed to open dialogue on
export control policies.4 9 Also, suspending Ex-Im funding at the time
would have meant that a $120 million power plant project in China
would have gone to European companies instead of Westinghouse, an
American corporation.'5 °
When the United States threatens to impose economic sanctions
only to reverse itself later, its cyclical dance amounts to the boy who
cried wolf. These empty threats give China a license to continue to
persecute Christians and other religious groups because Beijing has
learned that those admonitions generally lack teeth.5'
142. See Christy Cutbill McCormick, Comment, Exporting the First Amendment:
America's Response to Religious Persecution Abroad, 4 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 283,
313 (1998).
143. See Cheney, supra note 97, at 26.
144. See id. at 19.
145. See id.
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Options 13 and 15: Trade Sanctions
Options 13 and 15 will be discussed together as both provisions
refer to the U.S. imposition of trade sanctions against China;
specifically, limiting and/or denying Chinese procurement of U.S.
goods and vice versa.152
The United States rarely has used trade sanctions against China
to bargain for increased human rights, much less specifically for
religious freedom.'53 As a result of the Tiananmen Square Massacre
in June 1989, the U.S. government announced economic trade
sanctions against China.' 4 In response to such a blatant violation of
human rights, the senior President Bush suspended all "Government-
to-Government sales and commercial exports of weapons."'' 5 The
suspension of all weapon sales to China at the time totaled $600
million."6 However, imposing economic sanctions in exchange for
expanded human rights ended when the United States decided that
"an influx of foreign money into the Chinese market ma[de] its bid as
a better solution to solving human rights."'57
Trade sanctions, while probably effective,"' never will
materialize to expand religious freedom and other basic human rights.
U.S. economic sanctions will impact American trade as much as they
will Chinese commerce.'59 American businesses, recognizing the vast
opportunities in the Chinese market, pressure the President to refrain
152. These two options are as follows:
Option 13: Ordering Appropriate U.S. Agencies to Deny Issuance of
Licenses, Goods, and Technological Exports to Any Foreign Government,
Agency, Instrumentality, or Official that Violates Religious Freedom Under
the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Arms Export Control Act, the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or Any Other Statute Requiring Prior U.S.
Governmental Review and Approval as a Condition for the Export or Re-
export of Goods or Services.
Option 15: Prohibiting the U.S. Government from Procuring or Entering into
Any Contract for the Procurement of any Goods or Services from the Foreign
Government, Entities, or Official that Violates Religious Freedom.
153. Cheney, supra note 97, at 3.
154. Id. at 13.
155. See Crackdown in Beijing; Excerpts from Bush's News Session, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6,1989, at A15.
156. See Bernard Weinraub, Crackdown in Beijing; President Spurns Other
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMEs, June 6, 1989, at Al.
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from imposing economic sanctions.' 6' Also, imposing trade sanctions
would directly harm the U.S. government, as China has increased
trade with the United States and has even "become the leading buyer
of U.S. Treasury Bills."''6' Thus, it seems that the United States will
use trade sanctions as a last resort to effect change in human rights,
especially when it pertains to religious freedom.
B. Update on IRFA
As required by IRFA, the State Department issued its first
annual report in 1999, followed by its second in 2000, on international
religious freedom. These reports named China for two years in a
row as one of the most repressive countries when it comes to
oppressing Christians and other people of faith.163 Not surprisingly,
the Commission established by IRFA has found that the Chinese
government regularly harasses churches that will not register and
submit to official religious agencies."6 The Commission recommends
that U.S. diplomats discuss religious freedom in their interactions
with Beijing.' Also, it encourages the U.S. government to raise
awareness of religious persecution within the U.S. business
community, to encourage the latter to promote human rights in
countries where they engage in trade."
Despite the issuance of the IRFA reports as well as other U.S.
efforts to counter religious persecution, Chinese officials show no
particular concern over the matter.67 On the same day that the
Commission met with former President Clinton in 1999, two hundred
Public Security Bureau police officers stormed the house church of
well-known pastor Li De Xian in Guangzhou.'" They arrested Pastor
Li, his wife, and three others. 69 Just a week earlier, police officers
demolished a shelter outside the same church while detaining Pastor
160. Id.
161. Steven Mufson, China Sends Mixed Signals as Christopher Arrives; Beijing's
Leadership Seeks Closer Relations, But Not if it Means Interference by U.S., WASH.
POST, Nov. 20, 1996, at A21.
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Li, his wife, and other believers."' After the attack, Pastor Li
remarked it was the worst that he had encountered yet.' He likened
the scene around the church to the aftermath of an earthquake.'
The police have since detained Pastor Li on numerous occasions. 3 In
April 2000, for three out of fifteen days, they forced him into a
crouching position, his wrists and ankles shackled together so that he
could not sleep or use the toilet.7 4
Conclusion
While IRFA's measures may encourage other oppressive
countries to honor religious freedom, it has little or no teeth at all in
combating religious persecution in China. Although IRFA is
valuable legislation, it is a paper tiger with respect to China because
China generally does not respond well to the proposed demands
outlined in IRFA. While the United States continually should
reprimand China on its human rights record and threaten economic
and/or trade sanctions when appropriate, the United States should
not rely primarily upon these strategies to induce change in China.
Instead, the United States should hone in and exploit what China
already has revealed as its Achilles' heel-namely, cultural exchanges
between its citizenry and the international community.'75 As China
ascends into the global economy, it recognizes that such exchanges
are inevitable and possibly, necessary evils. Given China's
acquiescence to cultural exchanges, the United States may face less
resistance in utilizing this vehicle to promote religious freedom.
Thus, the United States should encourage educational exchange
programs, American business, and tourism in China. Instead of
investing all of its energy in influencing the Marxist-Leninist ideology
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citizenry interact with individual Chinese people on a one-on-one
basis. If any ideological revolution should occur, it will come from
the inside out, within China's own population.
While the United States can and should encourage religious
freedom in China, if there is to be any transformation, it will not be
primarily because of American efforts, but rather, in spite of them.
Although IRFA may be mostly ineffective in dealing with China, the
push towards promoting cultural exchange is certainly a step in the
right direction. Change will be a long and hard process as no
overnight solution exists for a problem that has festered on and off
for centuries.
